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Abstract: In this paper a distribution-free methodology is presented for providing robustness guarantees
for Nash equilibria (NE) of multi-agent games. Leveraging recent a posteriori developments of the
so called scenario approach (Campi et al., 2018), we provide probabilistic guarantees for feasibility
problems with polytopic constraints. This result is then used in the context of multi-agent games,
allowing to provide robustness certificates for constraint violation of any NE of a given game.
Our guarantees can be used alongside any NE seeking algorithm that returns some equilibrium
solution. Finally, by exploiting the structure of our problem, we circumvent the need of employing
computationally prohibitive algorithms to find an irreducible support subsample, a concept at the core of
the scenario approach. Our theoretical results are accompanied by simulation studies that investigate the
robustness of the solutions of two different problems, namely, a 2-dimensional feasibility problem and
an electric vehicle (EV) charging control problem.
Keywords: Scenario approach, Multi-agent games, Nash equilibria, Feasibility guarantees, Electric
vehicles
1. INTRODUCTION
Decentralized optimization and control of large scale systems
is of significant interest for a variety of fields ranging from
engineering and biology to economics and social sciences. In
many cases, systems of this kind can be modelled as a network
comprising self-interested entities/agents that interact/compete
with each other in order to meet their own individual goals, thus
giving rise to a noncooperative set-up. Aiming at the resolution
of the inherent conflict among the agents, a vast amount of
research work has been focused on game-theoretic approaches.
Especially in engineering, this framework has been extensively
used for the analysis of communication (Scutari et al., 2014),
(Alpcan et al., 2002) and traffic (Smith, 1979) networks, smart
grids (Saad et al., 2012), (Ma et al., 2013) and electricity
markets (Chen et al., 2014).
In real-world applications, however, the system is affected by
uncertainty that can be due to several factors. This gives rise
to games of incomplete information (Harsanyi, 1968). The
concept of Nash equilibrium (NE) (see Definition 2) typically
assumes complete information. For incomplete information
games the notion of NE appears insufficient to deal with the
presence of uncertainty, as the resulting agents’ strategies do
not necessarily exhibit any robustness properties against uncer-
tainty.
One of the first attempts to deal with uncertainty in multi-agent
games was noticed in (Harsanyi, 1962). Motivated by these
developments, two main research directions are encountered:
1) NE analysis based on particular models for the probability
distribution of the uncertainty (Harsanyi, 1968), (Couchman
et al., 2005), (Singh et al., 2016) and/or the geometry of its
? Research was supported by the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences
Research Council (EPSRC) under grant agreement EP/P03277X/1.
support (Aghassi and Bertsimas, 2006), (Hayashi et al., 2005)
and, 2) Distribution-free NE analysis, where no assumption on
the probability distribution of the uncertainty is imposed.
In this paper we focus on distribution-free NE seeking where
algorithmic developments have been quite restricted. Motivated
by the lack of distribution-free results, we leverage the recent
developments of the so called scenario approach (Campi et al.,
2018) and represent the uncertainty by means of scenarios
that could be either available as historical data, or extracted
via some prediction model. As such, the two main theoretical
pillars of this work are game theory and the scenario approach.
We attempt to transfer concepts from the scenario approach,
well-understood in the context of optimization, to multi-agent
games aiming to accompany game equilibria with guarantees
on the probability of constraint satisfaction.
The scenario approach is a well-established mathematical tech-
nique (Campi and Calafiore, 2006), (Campi and Garatti, 2008),
(Campi et al., 2008), and still a highly active research area (see
(Campi and Garatti, 2018), (Campi et al., 2018) for some recent
results), originally introduced to provide a priori probabilis-
tic guarantees for solutions of uncertain convex optimization
programs. Very recently, the theory has been extended to non-
convex decision making problems (Campi et al., 2018), where
the probabilistic guarantees are obtained in an a posteriori
fashion. The main advantage of the scenario approach is its
applicability under very general conditions, since it does not
require the knowledge of the uncertainty set or the probability
distribution, key assumptions in robust (Bai et al., 1997) and
stochastic optimization (Birge and Louveaux, 1997), respec-
tively.
According to the scenario approach, the original problem can be
approximated by solving a computationally tractable approx-
imate problem, the so called scenario program consisting of
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a finite number of constraints, each of them corresponding to
a different realization of the uncertain parameter. Apart from
its simplicity, the important feature of this program is its gen-
eralization properties, i.e., using a relatively small number of
samples, guarantees for the probability that its solution satisfies
a yet unseen constraint is obtained.
Only a few data-driven works for distribution-free NE seeking
have appeared in the literature with (Paccagnan and Campi,
2019) and (Fele and Margellos, 2019a), (Fele and Margellos,
2019b) being the most closely related to our work. Both pa-
pers attempt to bridge multi-agent games with the scenario
approach, thus providing a distribution-free way to determine
NE with quantifiable robustness properties. Specifically, in
(Paccagnan and Campi, 2019), the authors focus on variational
inequalities, a typical solution concept for multi-agent games
affected by uncertainty represented by means of scenarios. Due
to the connection between variational inequalities and NE, their
developments naturally find applications to multi-agent games.
However, the theoretical analysis requires strong monotonic-
ity of the operator associated with the variational inequalities,
which in a gaming setting implies uniqueness of the NE. The
latter is quite restrictive, as many games of practical interest
have multiple (possibly infinite) NE. In (Fele and Margellos,
2019a) and (Fele and Margellos, 2019b), multi-agent games
with uncertainty affecting agents’ cost functions are considered,
and once again uncertainty is tackled by means of the scenario
approach. However, agents’ constraint sets are assumed to be
deterministic. Uncertain constraints could still be considered,
under the restrictive assumption that they are decoupled. The
approach proposed here is instead applicable to general uncer-
tain constraints. The contributions of our paper with respect to
the aforementioned works are the following:
(1) Leveraging the recent results of (Campi et al., 2018), we
provide a posteriori robustness certificates for the entire
feasibility region of feasibility programs with polytopic
constraints.
(2) Focusing on multi-agent games, we provide distribution-
free probabilistic guarantees for the entire set of NE in an
a posteriori fashion. We extend the results of (Fele and
Margellos, 2019a) to account for uncertainty in agents’
(possibly) coupling constraints, while we do not require
uniqueness of the associated NE as in (Paccagnan and
Campi, 2019).
(3) The probabilistic results of recent works in an a posteriori
context (Campi and Garatti, 2018), (Campi et al., 2018)
rely on certain algorithms for quantifying a so called ir-
reducible support subsample (see Definition 2 in (Campi
and Garatti, 2018)). Restricting our attention to multi-
agent games, the use of such algorithms alongside NE
seeking iterative algorithms, apart from being computa-
tionally prohibitive, leads to erratic behaviour due to nu-
merical issues. In our case, the cardinality of the support
subsample coincides with the number of facets of the
polytopic constraint set, which is directly available.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 intro-
duces the problem under study and offers a motivating appli-
cation. Section 3 provides the theoretical analysis and proof
of the main results, namely, providing a posteriori guarantees
for feasibility problems. Section 4 provides numerical examples
and revisits the electric vehicle application of Section 2. Finally,
Section 5 concludes the paper and provides some directions for
future work.
2. SCENARIO-BASED MULTI-AGENT GAMES WITH
UNCERTAIN CONSTRAINTS
2.1 Gaming set-up
Let M be the total number of agents and xm = (xmt )
d
t=1 the
decision vector of dimension d ∈ N of agent m ∈ M =
{1, ...,M} taking values in the uncertain set Xmδ ⊆ Rd param-
eterized by the uncertain parameter δ . The uncertainty param-
eter is defined on the (possibly unknown) probability space
(∆,F ,P), where ∆ is the sample space, equipped with a σ -
algebra F and a probability measure P. Similarly, we de-
fine x−m = (x1, ...,xm−1,xm+1, ...,xM) ∈ X−mδ , where X−mδ =
∏ j∈M , j 6=m X
j
δ ⊆ Rd(M−1), as the vector comprising the deci-
sions of all other agents except for that of agent m. Finally, let
{δi}Ni=1 ∈ ∆N be a finite collection of independent and identi-
cally distributed (i.i.d.) scenarios/realisations of the uncertain
vector δ , where ∆N is the cartesian product of multiple copies
of the sample space ∆. In our set-up, agents are considered
as self-interested entities, i.e., they are interested in minimiz-
ing their own deterministic cost function Jm : X → R, where
X=∏Mm=1 Xm ⊆ RdM .
Furthermore, we impose the following assumption:
Assumption 1. Each agent’s decision set is formed by the in-
tersection of a deterministic decision space Xm and uncer-
tain affine constraints affected by any realization δ ∈ ∆, i.e.,⋂
δ∈∆Xmδ = {xm ∈ Xm : g(xm,x−m,δ )≤ 0}, ∀ m ∈M 1 , where
g : X×∆→ R is an affine function with respect to its first two
arguments.
Under Assumption 1, we consider a multi-agent game, whose
constraints are affected by uncertainty. Each agent m ∈ M
seeks to minimize her own cost function, given the strategies
x−m of all other players, by solving the following program
min
xm∈Xm
Jm(xm,x−m) subject to xm ∈
⋂
δ∈∆
Xmδ . (1)
For the convenience of the reader, we recall that δ is an uncer-
tain parameter defined on the (possibly) unknown probability
space (∆,F ,P). For the aforementioned problem, we consider
the solution concept of NE as presented in Definition 2.
Definition 2. (Bas¸ar and Olsder, 1999) A vector xNE =
(xmNE)m∈M is a NE of the associated game if and only if
Jm(xmNE ,x
−m
NE )≤ Jm(xm,x−mNE ) for any xm ∈
⋂
δ∈∆Xmδ and for any
m ∈M .
Due to the presence of uncertainty and the (possibly) infinite
cardinality of ∆, problem (1) is very difficult to solve, without
imposing any assumptions on the geometry of the sample set
∆ or the underlying probability distribution P. To circumvent
those issues, we approximate problem (1) by drawing multiple
i.i.d. samples {δi}Ni=1 ∈ ∆N and then considering the following
scenario-based NE seeking problem, where each agent m ∈M
solves the following optimization program
min
xm∈Xm
Jm(xm,x−m) subject to xm ∈
⋂
i=1,...,N
Xmδi . (2)
Our aim is to provide probabilistic feasibility guarantees for
the entire set of NE of (2) returned by an arbitrary NE seeking
1 Formally, the intersection
⋂
δ∈∆Xmδ of agent m possibly depends on the
strategies of all other agents, thus allowing the application of our results
in generalised NE problems. For simplicity we drop this dependence in the
subsequent analysis, as our main focus is the treatment of uncertainty.
algorithm, i.e., to quantify the probability that any NE strategy
xmNE of (2) belongs to the constraint set X
m
δ , ∀ m ∈M for a
new unseen sample δ ∈ ∆. To this end, our analysis is primarily
focused on feasibility problems affected by uncertainty. Based
on the derived results we revisit problem (1) and attempt
to provide robustness certificates for the obtained NE for a
motivating application which fits in this class of games, i.e,
the electric vehicle (EV) charging control problem, presented
below.
2.2 EV-charging control problem
The EV-charging control problem can be treated as a noncoop-
erative game comprised of self-interested agents-vehicles each
of them aiming at minimizing their own electricity cost, while
their charging schedules are subject to certain specifications.
The two main requirements for the operation of the system,
namely, the lower and upper bounds imposed on the charging
schedule and the total energy level to be achieved at the end of
charging, can be modeled as constraints of affine form. How-
ever, most of the work up to this point assumed that these con-
straints are purely deterministic (Ma et al., 2013), (Paccagnan
et al., 2019), (Deori et al., 2018). We extend this framework by
imposing uncertainty on the constraints. In this case, each agent
m ∈M solves the following problem
min
xm∈Rd
Jm(xm,x−m) subject to
xm ∈
⋂
δ∈∆
{[xm(δ ),xm(δ )]
⋂
{xm ∈ Rd :
d
∑
t=1
xmt ≥ Em(δ )}}. (3)
The variables xm = (xmt )
d
t=1 and Jm denote, respectively, the
charging schedule for all time instances t ∈ {1, . . . ,d} and the
electricity cost to be minimized for each vehicle m ∈M . The
uncertain constraint for each vehicle m comprises of uncertain
lower and upper bounds xm(δ ) and xm(δ ) and total energy
levels Em(δ ). The uncertainty inherent in those constraints
stems from several factors such as the battery dynamics of
each vehicle, the preferences of the users and the status of the
electric grid to name a few. Due to the presence of a variety
of unpredictable internal and external influences contributing
to the uncertainty of the system, it is very difficult to address
the problem using traditional probabilistic approaches. We thus
adopt a data-based approach, a more viable alternative.
3. PROBABILISTIC GUARANTEES OF FEASIBILITY
PROGRAMS
Motivated by the EV-charging control problem discussed in the
previous section, we leverage the recent results of the scenario
approach (Campi et al., 2018) to provide probabilistic guaran-
tees for the (possibly) multiple NE of (3) in a computationally
efficient manner. As NE constitute feasible solutions as far
as constraint satisfaction is concerned, we focus on obtaining
robustness certificates for a more general class of problems, that
of feasibility problems under uncertain constraints, where the
NE problem (3) emerges as a special case. As such, we consider
the following feasibility problem:
P∆ : find x ∈ X , subject to x ∈
⋂
δ∈∆
Xδ ,
where x is a decision vector belonging to the set X ⊂ Rd
and δ is a random variable, defined as in Section 2.1, that
encodes the uncertainty parameterizing agents’ constraint sets.
Note that for the gaming set-up, as introduced in Section 2,
X = X = ∏m∈M Xm and Xδ = ∏m∈M Xmδ . For the feasibility
problem under study, we define the following scenario program:
PN : find x ∈ X subject to x ∈
⋂
i=1,...,N
Xδi ,
where N denotes the number of samples δi, i= 1, ...,N, drawn in
an i.i.d. fashion from ∆ according to the probability distribution
P and Xδi their respective constraints. Our results depend on
an affine constraint structure, thus we impose the following
standing assumption:
Assumption 3.
(1) The deterministic constraint set X is a non-empty, com-
pact and convex polytope 2 .
(2) For each δ ∈ ∆, Xδ = {x ∈ Rd : g(x,δ ) = aT x− b ≤ 0},
where g is an affine function given by the mapping g : X×
∆→ R, where a ∈ Rd , b ∈ R and δ = (aT b) ∈ Rd+1.
(3) For each multi-sample {δi}Ni=1 the polytope
ΠN = {⋂Ni=1 Xδi}⋂X = {x ∈ X : g(x,δi)≤ 0, i = 1, ...,N}
has a non-empty interior.
Note that vector valued affine functions are also captured by our
framework; see example of Section 4. Assumption 3 guarantees
that the polytope ΠN is compact and PN admits at least one so-
lution for any chosen multisample {δi}Ni=1. Under Assumption
3 the feasibility problem PN can be equivalently written as
PN : find x subject to x ∈ΠN .
Upon finding the feasibility domain ΠN of the problem PN ,
we are interested in investigating the robustness properties
collectively for all the points of this domain to yet unseen
samples, in other words in quantifying the probability that a
new sample δ ∈ ∆ is drawn such that the constraint Xδ defined
by this sample is not satisfied by some given point x∈ΠN . This
concept, which is of crucial importance for our work, is known
in the literature as the probability of violation and is adapted in
our context to represent the probability of violation of a set. By
Definition 1 in (Campi and Calafiore, 2006) the probability of
violation of a given point x ∈ΠN is defined as
V (x) = P
{
δ ∈ ∆ : x /∈ Xδ
}
. (4)
By Assumption 3, the probability of violation can be equiva-
lently written as V (x) = P
{
δ ∈ ∆ : g(x,δ ) > 0
}
. We can now
define the probability of violation of the polytope ΠN .
Definition 4. LetP ⊆ 2X be the set of all non-empty, compact
and convex polytopes that are subsets of X . For anyΠN ∈P we
define the probability of violation of the set ΠN as a mapping
V :P → [0,1] given by the following relation:
V(ΠN) = sup
x∈ΠN
V (x).
Definition 4 can be considered a special case of Definition 2
in (Grammatico et al., 2016). In Definition 5 three concepts of
crucial importance are introduced.
Definition 5. (1) For any N, an algorithm is a mapping AN :
∆N → P that associates the multisample {δi}Ni=1 to a
unique polytope ΠN ∈P .
2 A polytope Π ∈ Rd can be expressed by its H-representation, i.e., the
intersection of a finite number of halfspaces, and also as the convex hull of its
vertex set v(Π) = {x1, ...,xQ} i.e, Π = conv(v(Π)) = {∑Qj=1 x jλ j : ∑Qj=1 λ j =
1,λ j ≥ 0, j = 1, ...,Q}, where v(·) and conv(·) denote the set of vertices of
the polytope and the convex hull, respectively. This representation is generally
known as V -representation.
(2) Given a multisample {δi}Ni=1 ∈ ∆N , a support subsample
S ⊆ {δi}Ni=1 is a subset of the entire multisample with
cardinality k ≤ N so that for i1 < i2 < ... < ik and Ik =
{i1, i2, ..., ik}, S = {δi}i∈Ik is such that Ak({δi}i∈Ik) =
AN({δi}Ni=1), i.e., the solution returned by an algorithm
when fed with the subsample is the same with the one
obtained when the entire multisample is used.
(3) A support subsample function is a function of the form
BN : {δi}Ni=1 → {i1, ..., ik} that takes as input all the sam-
ples and returns as output the indices of only these samples
that constitute an irreducible 3 support subsample.
Note that the notions of support subsample and support sub-
sample function in Definitions 5.2, 5.3 are respectively referred
to as compression set and compression function in (Margellos
et al., 2015). Moreover, Definition 5.3 in our case translates into
the relation ΠN =Π{δi}i∈Ik , where the cardinality of the support
subsample {δi}i∈Ik is by definition the cardinality of the output
of the function BN .
Let KN = |v(ΠN)| and FN be the number of vertices and the
number of facets 4 of ΠN , respectively. As shown in Theorem
8.2(b) of (Bronsted, 1982), FN is finite. It is important to
emphasize that the dependence of the polytope ΠN on the
multi-sample {δi}Ni=1 implies that both FN and KN are random
variables that depend on {δi}Ni=1.
Next we define the set
Pδ = {Π ∈P : g(x,δ )≤ 0, ∀ x ∈ v(Π)}
= {Π ∈P : Π⊆ Xδ}, (5)
of all the non-empty, compact and convex polytopes Π that
satisfy the constraint associated with the sample δ ∈ ∆. Note
that if all the vertices of the polytope satisfy the inequality
g(·,δ )≤ 0, then every point x ∈Π of the polytope satisfies it as
well, since x can always be expressed as a convex combination
of the polytope’s vertices.
We are now ready to introduce the following theorem, which is
the main result of our paper.
Theorem 6. Consider Assumption 3 and any AN ,BN as in Def-
inition 5. Fix β ∈ (0,1) and define the violation level ε :
{0, ...,N}→ [0,1] as a function such that
ε(N) = 1 and
N−1
∑
k=0
(
N
k
)
(1− ε(k))N−k = β . (6)
We have that
PN
{
{δi}Ni=1 ∈ ∆N : V(ΠN)> ε(FN)
}
≤ β ,
where PN =∏Ni=1P is the product probability measure, and FN
is the number of facets of ΠN .
Proof : The first part of the proof closely follows that of Theo-
rem 1 in (Grammatico et al., 2016). For a fixed multisample
{δi}Ni=1 ∈ ∆N consider an arbitrary point x ∈ ΠN . Then, the
following inequalities are satisfied
3 A support subsample S = {δi}i∈Ik ⊆ {δi}Ni=1 is said to be irreducible if no
element can be further removed from S leaving the solution unchanged.
4 For a definition of the facets of a polytope we refer the reader to Definition 8
of the Appendix.
V (x) = P
{
δ ∈ ∆ : x /∈ Xδ
}
= P
{
δ ∈ ∆ : g(x,δ )> 0
}
(i)
= P
{
δ ∈ ∆ : g( ∑
j∈Id+1
λ jx j,δ )> 0
}
(ii)
= P
{
δ ∈ ∆ : ∑
j∈Id+1
λ jg(x j,δ )> 0
}
≤ P
{
δ ∈ ∆ : ∑
j∈Id+1
λ j max
j∈Id+1
g(x j,δ )> 0
}
≤ P
{
δ ∈ ∆ : max
j∈Id+1
g(x j,δ )> 0
}
= P
{ ⋃
j∈Id+1
{
δ ∈ ∆ : g(x j,δ )> 0
}}
(iii)
≤ P
{ KN⋃
j=1
{
δ ∈ ∆ : g(x j,δ )> 0
}}
. (7)
Equality (i) is derived from Caratheodory’s Theorem (Theo-
rem 1.1 in (Monroy and Huemer, 2015)) where the set under
study is the polytope ΠN . In our case, Caratheodory’s Theorem
states that any arbitrary point of the polytope x ∈ ΠN can be
represented as a convex combination of at most d + 1 vertices
from the set v(ΠN), which means that there exists a subset of
indices Id+1 ⊆ {1, ...,KN} such that x = ∑ j∈Id+1 λ jx j, where
∑ j∈Id+1 λ j = 1 and λ j ≥ 0, ∀ j ∈ Id+1. Equality (ii) stems from
the fact that g is an affine function of x for any given δ ∈ ∆
due to Assumption 3. The last inequality follows from the fact
that Id+1 ⊆ {1, ...,KN}, due to the fact that KN ≥ d + 1 as the
polytope has a non-empty interior by Assumption 3 (3). Since
(7) holds for all x ∈ΠN , we have that
V(ΠN) = sup
x∈ΠN
V (x)≤ P
{ KN⋃
j=1
{
δ ∈ ∆ : g(x j,δ )> 0
}}
.
Therefore, for any multisample {δi}Ni=1 and for any cardinality
(not necessarily irreducible) of the support subsample k ∈
{1, ...,N} the following inequalities are satisfied:
PN
{
{δi}Ni=1 ∈ ∆N : V(ΠN)> ε(k)
}
≤ PN
{
{δi}Ni=1 ∈ ∆N :
P
{ KN⋃
j=1
{
δ ∈ ∆ : g(x j,δ )> 0
}}
> ε(k)
}
= PN
{
{δi}Ni=1∈ ∆N :
P
{
δ ∈ ∆ : ∃x ∈ v(ΠN),g(x,δ )>0
}
>ε(k)
}
= PN
{
{δi}Ni=1 ∈ ∆N :
P
{
δ ∈ ∆ : ΠN 6⊆ Xδ
}
> ε(k)
}
, (8)
where the last inequality is due to (5). Define now an algorithm
AN as in Definition 5.1, that returns the polytope confined
by the feasibility region of PN . By construction, AN satisfies
Assumption 1 of (Campi et al., 2018), since for any multisam-
ple {δi}Ni=1 it holds that A({δi}Ni=1) ∈Pδi , for all i = 1, ..,N.
The satisfaction of Assumption 1 paves the way for the use
of Theorem 1 of (Campi et al., 2018). In particular, Theorem
1 of (Campi et al., 2018) implies that the right-hand side of
(8) can be upper bounded by β , for k being the cardinality
of an irreducible support subsample (see Definition 5.1). For
our case, an irreducible (in fact minimal) subsample coincides
with the minimum number of facets that construct the polytope
ΠN , i.e., k = FN = rank([H L]), where matrices H, L are of
appropriate dimension and constitute the H-representation of
ΠN , i.e., ΠN = {x ∈ Rd : Hx≤ L}. As such, we have that
PN
{
{δi}Ni=1 ∈ ∆N : P
{
δ ∈ ∆ :ΠN 6⊆ Xδ
}
> ε(FN)
}
=
PN
{
{δi}Ni=1 ∈ ∆N : P
{
δ ∈ ∆ :ΠN /∈Pδ
}
> ε(FN)
}
≤ β . (9)
From (8) and (9) we obtain that:
PN
{
{δi}Ni=1 ∈ ∆N : V(ΠN)> ε(FN)
}
≤ β , (10)
thus concluding the proof. 2
Note that, even though within the proof of our theorem we
also use the V-representation of the polytope, only the number
of facets are needed to provide probabilistic guarantees for
the entire feasibility region. This feature is appealing from a
computational point of view as, in most practical cases, the
constructed polytope has a significantly smaller number of
facets than vertices. To illustrate this, consider the EV charging
control problem of Section 2. Vehicles’ charging schedule
is subject to upper and lower bounds at each time instance
t ∈ {1, . . . ,d}. Hence, for a multi-sample {δi}Ni=1 ∈ ∆N , the
feasibility domain ∏
t∈{1,...,d}
∏
m∈M
⋂
i=1,...,N
[xmt (δi),xmt (δi)] of the
problem is a hyperrectangle whose number of facets FN = 2Md
grows linearly with respect to the number of decision variables,
while the number of vertices is given by KN = 2Md , which
grows at an exponential rate with respect to d. In the Appendix
we provide a relationship betweenV(ΠN) and the probability of
constraint violation of the polytope’s vertices. This is not used
further in the paper but is interesting per se.
Quantifying the cardinality of the minimal support subsample
becomes trivial, since in our case it coincides with the number
of facets, thus circumventing the need of employing the greedy
algorithm in (Campi et al., 2018). A direct consequence of
Theorem 6 is that we can provide distribution-free guarantees
for any NE of problem (1). To solidify this statement we
introduce the following corollary
Corollary 7. Consider Assumption 3 and the setting of Theo-
rem 6. We have that
PN
{
{δi}Ni=1 ∈ ∆N : V (xNE)> ε(FN), for any xNE of (2)
}
≤ β .
Note that the choice of algorithm to determine a NE of the
problem is arbitrary.
4. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
4.1 Feasibility of a random 2-dimensional polytope
We initially apply our results to a 2-dimensional example of a
polytope constructed by the intersection of random halfspaces
of the form a1x1 +a2x2−b≤ 0, where a1,a2 and b are scalars
following uniform distributions with support [−4,4], [−4,4]
and [10,15], respectively. Each sample δ is defined as a vector
δ = (a1,a2,b) ∈ R3.
The theoretical relation between the violation level ε(k) for
different values of k is illustrated in Figure 1, where ε is
computed according to (6) by fixing the confidence parameter
to β = 10−6. The colour code corresponds to different choices
of the number of samples N. As it can easily be observed,
choosing a larger number of samples improves the robustness
3 5 10 15 20 25
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Fig. 1. The violation level ε(k) as a function of the empirically most
frequently observed numbers of facets k. Confidence level is set to
β = 10−6, while four different choices for the number of samples N are
investigated.
Fig. 2. The empirical probability of violation of each point of the polytope
under study constructed by 100 random realizations of the affine con-
straints a1x1 + a2x2 − b ≤ 0. The number of grid points is R = 48633,
while 10000 test samples are used. Note that the higher probability of
violation occurs at one of the vertices (red diamonds).
guarantees of the feasibility region significantly, as lower ε(k)
implies lower probability of constraint violation.
To test the validity of our theoretical bounds in practice we need
to compute the probability of violation V(ΠN) and compare
it with the guarantees provided by Theorem 6. Let Vˆ(ΠN)
denote an empirical estimate of V(ΠN) and Vˆ (x) an empirical
estimate of a point x ∈ ΠN . By gridding the polytope using a
large enough number of points xr,r = 1, ...,R that cover the
entire polytope we have that Vˆ(ΠN) = maxr=1,...,R V (xr). A
sufficiently large number of test samples is used, different from
those used to construct the polytope.
To this end, we generate a total number of N = 100 samples for
the construction of the random polytope shown in Figure 2 and
use 10000 test samples to compute the empirical probability of
violation for each point of the grid. The highest probability of
violation occurs at a polytope vertex; Lemma 1 provides some
theoretical support to this numerical evidence, by showing that
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Fig. 3. Comparison of the theoretical ε(k) derived from Theorem 6 (blue) and
the worst-case empirical probability of violation of the entire polytope
that corresponds to each k (red). We generated 50 different polytopes,
each of them using 2000 samples, while for each one the worst case
probability corresponds to the grid point with the highest probability
of constraint violation. The confidence level was fixed to β = 10−6.
Note that the non-monotonic behaviour for the empirical probability of
violation is due to the fact that for any number of facets k the number
of polytopes among which the worst-case probability of violation is
calculated is not the same.
the worst-case probability of violation is proportional to the
worst-case vertex violation. A tighter relation for certain class
of programs is currently under investigation.
Finally, we validate the derived theoretical bounds against the
empirical probability of violation of 50 independent realiza-
tions of polytopes. This means that each polytope is constructed
using a different multi-sample {δi}2000i=1 . By keeping the same
value for β , as in the previous case, we count the number
of facets FN of each polytope and then compute the theoret-
ical bound of the violation level that corresponds to it. Sub-
sequently, using 20000 test samples we compute an empirical
estimate of the probability of violation for each polytopic re-
alisation, as outlined above. If there is more than one polytope
among the 50 that has the same number of facets, we choose
the one with the maximum empirical probability of violation.
As anticipated, ε(k) constitutes an upper bound for any of the
computed empirical probabilities of violation.
4.2 PEV charging game revisited
We revisit the EV charging control game of Section 2.2. Our
aim is to provide guarantees on the probability that a NE satis-
fies the constraints of (3). We assume that the upper constraint
(xm(δu))m∈M ∈ RMd is affected by an additive uncertainty in
the form of δu ∈ RMd , whose elements are random realisations
of 0.3U(0,1) ·N (1,3), where U(0,1) is a random variable that
follows a uniform distribution with support [0,1] and N (1,3)
another random variable that follows the gaussian distribution
with mean 1 and standard deviation 3. As such, xm(δu)= xnom+
δu, where xnom is a given deterministic component. The total
energy E = (Em)m∈M of each agent at the end of charging
is also affected by uncertainty i.e., Em = (1− δe)Emnom, where
δe ∈ RM and its elements are extracted according to the proba-
bility 0.05N (0,1) and Emnom ∈ R is the nominal final energy
demand of each agent m ∈ M drawn from U(10,17). The
uncertainty vector is given by δ = [δu,δe]∈RM(d+1). The lower
bound is assumed to be deterministic and, particularly, xi = 0
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Fig. 4. The empirical probability of violation of the entire polytope Vˆ(ΠN)
(green) and the empirical probability of violation of the computed NE
returned by the algorithm of (Fele and Margellos, 2019a),(Fele and
Margellos, 2019b), namely, Vˆ (xNE ) (red) versus the theoretical violation
level of Theorem 6 (blue) with respect to five different values of the num-
ber of samples N = 20000,50000,75000,100000,200000. The empirical
probability of violation for both the polytope and the NE is computed
using 2000000 test samples. Note that the blue line corresponds to the
theoretical counterpart of the green one.
for any i∈M . Finally, the cost function of each vehicle m∈M
is given by Jm(xm,x−m) = (xm)T (A0σ(xm,x−m) + b0), where
the matrix A0 ∈ Rd×d is diagonal and σ(xm,x−m) = ∑Mm=1 xm.
Following the work of (Fele and Margellos, 2019a), (Fele and
Margellos, 2019b) the entries {at}dt=1 of A0 = diag({at}dt=1) are
evaluated by rescaling a winter weekday demand profile in the
UK (NationalGrid, 2019). The vector b0 ∈ Rd is set to zero.
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Fig. 5. Charging schedules of agents 2 (red solid line) and 4 (blue solid line)
and their respective uncertain upper bounds. The agents’ schedules and
their upper constraints coincide during the beginning and the end of the
horizon, which implies that they are charging at their boundaries in their
attempt to benefit from the price die during these time instances.
To compute the NE of (3) we employed the algorithm of
(Fele and Margellos, 2019b) (see Algorithm 1 therein). Setting
the number of agents to M = 10, the number of timesteps
to d = 12 and β = 10−5, we run the algorithm for multi-
samples of different size, namely, 20000, 50000, 75000, 100000
and 200000 and we compare the behaviour of two different
probabilities with respect to the cardinality of the multisample,
as illustrated in Figure 4. With green we illustrate the worst
case empirical probability of violation for the polytope Vˆ(ΠN)
(calculated by taking the maximum violation among all grid
points on the polytope), while with red we show the empirical
probability Vˆ (xNE) of violation for the xNE returned by the
algorithm of (Fele and Margellos, 2019a),(Fele and Margellos,
2019b). Note that the blue line is the theoretical counterpart of
the green line and corresponds to the theoretical violation level
ε(k), as defined in Theorem 6. The empirical calculation was
performed using 2000000 test samples, different from those
used in the NE seeking process. As expected, both empirical
values are less than the theoretical bound derived by Theorem
6. It was also anticipated that for any multisample we would
have that Vˆ(ΠN) ≥ Vˆ (xNE) as the former corresponds to the
collective violation of all feasible points, including xNE . Finally,
Figure 5 illustrates the charging schedules of two of the agents
and their respective uncertain upper bounds. Due to the high
required total energy at the end of charging, we observe that the
agents’ schedules and their upper constraints coincide during
the beginning and the end of the horizon, which implies that
they are charging at their boundaries in their attempt to exploit
the low price during these time instances and minimize their
charging cost.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Considering a feasibility problem under uncertain polytopic
constraints, we provided probabilistic guarantees for the entire
feasibility set in an a posteriori fashion. The importance of
this result is better shown in the context of the EV-charging
control problem where computationally efficient robustness
certificates are obtained for the NE returned by any algorithm.
Effort is being made towards extending our results to include
feasibility problems subject to uncertain convex constraints and
in investigating the case of uncertain games where each agent’s
samples are drawn from her own private uncertainty set, rather
than from a common set of samples. Finally, simulation results
indicate the validity of a stronger statement than that of Lemma
1, that is, the highest probability of violation among all the
points of the polytope occurs at (at least) one of its vertices
for some problems; we aim to investigate theoretically the class
of programs for which this indication is valid.
6. APPENDIX
We provide some auxiliary definitions for the analysis of Sec-
tion 3.
Definition 8. (valid inequalities, faces and facets) (Ziegler,
1995)
(1) Let Π ⊂ Rd be a convex polytope. An affine inequality
aT x≤ b, where a, b are of appropriate dimensions, is valid
for Π, if it is satisfied for all points x ∈Π.
(2) A face of Π is defined as any set of the form
f =Π∩{x ∈ Rd : aT x = b}, where
aT x≤ b is a valid inequality for Π. (11)
(3) If alongside (11), the additional condition dim( f ) =
dim(Π)−1 is satisfied, where dim( f ), dim(Π) denote the
dimensions of the face f and the polytope Π, respectively,
then the face is also referred to as a facet of the polytope.
The following lemma provides an additional result, which even
though it is not used for our derivations, is interesting per se.
Lemma 1. Consider the sets X and Xδi , i = 1, ...,N, that satisfy
Assumption 3. Then for any given multisample (δ1, ...,δN) ∈
∆N , there exists a vertex xˆ ∈ v(ΠN) such that that:
V(ΠN)≤ (d+1)P
{
δ ∈ ∆ : xˆ /∈ Xδ
}
= (d+1)V (xˆ).
Proof : Consider a fixed multisample and any arbitrary point
x ∈ ΠN . By relation (iii) of (7) we can follow an alternative
direction which leads to the following inequalities:
V (x)≤ P
{ ⋃
j∈Id+1
{
δ ∈ ∆ : g(x j,δ )> 0
}}
≤ ∑
j∈Id+1
P
{
δ ∈ ∆ : g(x j,δ )> 0
}
≤ ∑
j∈Id+1
max
j∈Id+1
P
{
δ ∈ ∆ : g(x j,δ )> 0
}
= (d+1) max
j∈Id+1
P
{
δ ∈ ∆ : g(x j,δ )> 0
}
≤ (d+1) max
j=1,...,KN
P
{
δ ∈ ∆ : g(x j,δ )> 0
}
= (d+1) V (xˆ),
where V (xˆ) =max j=1,...,KN P
{
δ ∈∆ : g(x j,δ )> 0
}
is the max-
imum probability of violation among the vertices x ∈ v(ΠN).
This concludes our proof. 2
The inequality V (x) ≤ (d + 1) V (xˆ), ∀ x ∈ ΠN can be equiv-
alently stated as: There exists xˆ ∈ v(ΠN) such that V(ΠN) =
supx∈ΠN V (x) ≤ (d + 1)V (xˆ), which means that to bound the
probability of violation of the entire polytope, as defined in
Definition 4, we only need to know the number of decision vari-
ables and the vertex with the highest probability of violation.
This relation forms a bridge between the notion of violation of
a point and that of a set.
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